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7 Maximising the health of 
the whole community 
The principal objective of the NHS ought to be to maximise the 
aggregate improvement in the health status of the whole community 
The case for 
TONY CULYER 
Caveats 
It seems a pity to compromise what seems uncompromising, but let us 
begin with some health warnings. 
First, "principal" does not mean "only", and some of the other things 
the NHS does (and ought to do) turn out to be necessary anyway if it is 
to achieve this prime objective. Moreover, efficiency (which is what 
maximising is about) needs always to be tempered by consideration of 
equity in both process and outcome. 
Second, let's remind ourselves that most moral objectives (of which this 
is one) do not lose their force by virtue of being impossible to attain—one 
of the reasons for having moral rules about anything is that they provide 
bases for judging how well one is doing with respect to what one ought to 
be doing. 
Third, let's remember that there are good reasons for our having taken 
health care out of the "ordinary" market place. These include: a 
solidarity type case that ensures no one is excluded from benefit on grounds 
of lack of portable, transparent, and comprehensive entitlement; protection 
from professional dominance in the determination of both general 
healthcare priorities and specific patient—doctor relations (in any system of 
health care it is primarily the doctor who determines the demand for care, 
not the patient); equity in funding arrangements, processes, and outcome 
(mainly health); and the provision of care that is more likely to confer 
benefit than harm. 
Fourth, maximising such an objective involves not only a commitment 
to the ethicality of that which is being maximised, but also embodies within 
it a host of other ethical issues; these often take the form of trade offs, 
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whose exposure, discussion, and resolution by people with legitimate rights 
to be involved is important. 
Fifth, maximising anything implies the need for particular sorts of 
knowledge: for information about health status, changes in it, its 
decomposition into relevant population subgroups, and believable 
attribution of such changes to causes (whether they lie in the delivery of 
health care or through other means). 
Finally, the desirability of measurement in general ought to be 
distinguished from the suitability and acceptability of any specific measure. 
One desideratum of any measure of health or health gain is that it should 
enable interpersonal comparisons of health gain (or loss) to be made; this 
is one of the striking departures from the more general utilitarian objectives 
customarily set by economists in evaluating the advantages and 
disadvantages of various institutions and policy options. A common 
objection to health measurement is not so much an objection to outcome 
measurement itself as to either a particular measure of it (for example, that 
it misses something important out) or to a particular way of using a measure 
(for example, not weighting prospective health gain, or prospective health 
gainers, differentially according to morally relevant factors). One of the 
attractions of explicit measures of prospective outcome is that they clearly 
expose sins of commission and omission. Thus, they enable the explicit 
discussion and implementation of equity based desiderata, rather than 
leaving them to the uninformed whim of individuals and committees with 
influence. 
NHS ought to be about maximising health 
There can be no doubt that a principal objective of the NHS is to maximise 
health. We have ministerial authority for that. The more interesting, non-
factual assertion is that it ought to do this. The ethical underpinnings for 
my view are that it ought fie in the importance of good health for people 
to lead flourishing lives, which I take as an ultimate good. We can all think 
of individuals with terrible handicaps of ill health who seem to flourish 
but these are not persuasive counter examples. Such people excite our 
admiration and are seen as exceptional. 
In general, I take it that flourishing is an ultimate good and that good 
health is in general a necessary condition for achieving this ultimate good. 
In short, health is needed in the twin senses that it is both necessary (just 
as my possessing a Rolls-Royce is a necessary sign of my personal success 
in life) and serves an ethically commendable end. This gives an otherwise 
merely technical relationship between means and ends its ethically 
persuasive quality and raises the need for health to high ethical significance 
(in a way that is not true for my need for a "roller"). 
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To take the argument further, health care (including medical care) may 
be a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for realising better health. 
If so, it too is needed (that is, is necessary if improved health is to be 
attained) and it too derives its ethically compelling character from the 
ethicality of the flourishing that is the ultimate good. So, not only may it 
be reasonably assumed that individuals want health care; they also need it 
in an ethically persuasive sense of the word. 
If all that is accepted, maximising the health of populations becomes an 
ethical objective, as does being efficient so that the resources used in health 
care are used to maximise health outcomes. This is not the same as 
maximising the use of beneficial health care—or effectiveness. It differs 
from it principally in that delivering only that care which is most effective 
takes no account of the opportunity cost of such care (a highly effective 
but very costly treatment may rightly be given lower priority than a less 
effective but much cheaper one) when both cannot be delivered to all who 
might benefit. Distributive justice also acquires a high priority: in my view 
(which is not that equity is sufficiently served by maximising some equity 
weighted outcome measure) this is best tackled in terms of seeking to 
identify and move towards a more equal distribution of health across the 
population while at the same time ensuring that each procedure offered to 
patients is that believed (on the best evidence available) to be the most 
cost effective. This will not usually imply an equal distribution of resources, 
nor will it imply a curmudgeonly equality in which everyone gets nothing 
(equally). It actually implies, given current knowledge of the way medical 
technology is deployed, both a rise in the average health of people and a 
more equal distribution of health. There are twin problems for social 
decision makers here. One (for healthcare commissioners and providers) 
is the selective use of their resources to achieve objectives efficiently. Others 
(for higher level decision makers) involve trading off other ultimately good 
things which we might legitimately seek in pursuit of flourishing lives but 
which compete with health care in the battle for resources. There is no 
room for absolutism here, for there is more than one means to the great 
ethical end of flourishing. Nor can every desirable thing be done for 
everyone. Conflict, and the need to choose, is inevitable. 
Efficiency and equity aren't always in opposition 
Conflicts can, however, be overdone. One that is commonly overdone 
is the alleged clash between efficiency and equity. If we define efficiency 
in a health service as being the maximisation of probable health outcomes, 
and there is also an acceptable quantification of these outcomes across the 
variety of activity we call "health services", then there exists, as a matter 
of logic, such a maximum for every possible distribution of resources to 
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individuals. All these possible distributions are efficient. But all are most 
certainly not fair or equitable. Choosing between these possible 
distributions, all of which are efficient, cannot involve any conflict between 
efficiency and equity—unless you make the additional ethical judgment 
that the marginal unit of outcome is always of equal value to whomsoever 
it accrues. I see no compelling moral argument for such a judgment. 
Talking theoretically, although difficult, can sound glib. In practice one 
is in a sea of uncertainty, even in a world as conceptually simple as that 
just described. There is a deficit of usable relevant information on health 
itself, its distribution across population groups, on health gains (actual or 
projected), on the links between the activities of the NHS and their final 
impact on people's health, on the reasons for the huge variations that can 
be measured between practitioners and the variations in outcomes that 
individual practitioners achieve. As a practical example, the enormous 
clinically inexplicable variations in general practitioners' referrals within 
and across health authority areas are a source of both deep inequity and 
substantial inefficiency which only health authorities can address. 
For many in the research and development commissioning communities, 
these lacunae provide the (ethical) momentum for changes that have 
recently been set in train in the research and development programme, for 
the intelligent use of evidence based medicine, for outcome measurement, 
and for the partial separation of the activity of healthcare commissioning 
from healthcare delivery. There is an act of faith involved here, which is 
that more evidence relating to the components of the links in the flourishing 
healthcare cascade is a good thing. This involves a belief that more (relevant) 
information is better than less and a commitment to the principle that the 
best should not be allowed to become the enemy of the good. 
Information not a substitute for judgment 
Undoubtedly, the mere provision of information is insufficient—at the 
very least it will need interpretation in particular contexts by patients and 
professionals who understand enough of its limitations not to fall into the 
trap of supposing that information can ever be a substitute for judgment 
(including clinical judgment). Moreover, there is abundant evidence that 
the mere provision of even very good information is not itself sufficient to 
get the professionals to act on it. Further, issues of value pervade the entire 
decision structure. At one level it is impossible to define "health" without 
value judgments (whose should they be?); at another, it is usually impossible 
to determine the appropriate course of medical actions for a particular 
patient without making patient specific value judgments (whose, again, 
should these be?). There are values to be selected at all points in between. 
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As I wrote at the beginning, improved health is not the only business of 
the NHS. In relations with patients a common task in both primary and 
secondary care is to provide information—and no more: information that 
a person does not have the disease he or she feared, about whom outside 
the NHS to contact for help with a problem, about healthy lifestyles, and 
so on. Plainly, such information serves an ethical end. Moreover, it may 
also serve the end of health maximisation—health education, for example. 
The institutional side of the NHS also provides hotel services, which ought 
to be provided efficiently but which may not raise questions of distributive 
equity of the same compelling sort as does active medical care itself and 
might be left to private purchasing power and insurance arrangements 
without damaging the objectives of the NHS. 
Similarly, equity in the distribution of health (or of health gain, or of 
healthcare resources) does not exhaust what ought to be proper equity 
concerns in the NHS. Procedures and processes too must be fair. It is not 
fair: to keep similarly placed people waiting avoidably different times; for 
professionals to be rude or inconsiderate; to treat professionals within the 
system as though they were employees in a command economy, or to set 
them professional targets without also supplying the means by which they 
might meet them; or to exclude those for whom the NHS exists from 
decisions about the values that are to be incorporated in the layers of this 
many tiered cake. 
Work on measures is needed 
Setting an objective of the sort postulated here is not the usual way that 
economists have approached issues of efficiency and equity. They have more 
usually had a particular and rather sophisticated branch of utilitarianism to 
set the conceptual rules for resource allocation which goes under the name 
"Paretian welfare economics". This is the view that decisions ought to 
maximise subjectively perceived welfare, that the only identifiable 
improvements are those where no one loses such welfare and at least one 
gains some, and that in situations where some gain and others lose one 
can only sit on one's hands. Some of us have rejected this framework for 
health and health care not because we want to reject the respect for 
individual values which is enshrined within its ethical frame but because 
it fails to deliver practical guidelines with practical consequences and, 
where it does, does so with severe limitations. A particular weakness of the 
traditional Paretian approach is that it affords no leverage on choices that 
have to be made which involve some people losing while others gain—which 
is, sadly, the usual situation. The usual evaluative framework is also silent 
for choices that are based on considerations of equity. 
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This is not true of the object set here (maximising health) provided that 
a suitable measure of the thing to be maximised is available. Twenty five 
years ago no such measure was available. That is no longer true. A battery 
of claimants exists, each of which has its advantages and disadvantages 
and some of which may be more appropriate to some types of choice than 
others. We need appropriate measures for all the outputs of the NHS that 
are of prime concern and indicators of the varied dimensions that equity 
takes. We also need a community of users of this information who can 
interpret and use it towards the NHS's objective and who can feed problems 
back to the consumer and the professional, managerial, and research 
communities so that improvements and refinements can be made and 
lacunae filled. All this entails comprehensive partnerships and dialogue 
across a spectrum of communities and interest groups. It also requires 
education, training, and research. 
The practical problem at all levels of the NHS is to be able to apply 
consistent and acceptable principles to answer questions like: Which services 
shall be available? To whom shall they be available? On what conditions 
shall they be available? These questions are all rationing questions, and 
the principles need to be practically useful and defensible by those who 
use them. If you don't find mine acceptable (at least they meet the 
requirements of consistency and applicability and are derived from a set 
of explicit ethical considerations), then what are your alternatives—and 
how would you expect ministers, the NHS Executive, NHS managers, and 
NHS professionals to implement them? 
